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Question 11 · Open question

What rules of sharing and punishment might have existed?

No law of the Taş Tepeler survives, and none ever will. What can be offered is ethnographic analogy: how recent foragers share food, cut the boastful down to size and deal with those who break the rules. It is analogy, not evidence.

Published 3 min read

Competing views

  • AEgalitarian levelling

    Food from the hunt and the feast was shared widely, boasting was mocked and stinginess was the worst offence. Sanctions were gossip, ridicule and, at the limit, exclusion.

  • BEmerging ownership

    Long-lived buildings and repeated investment imply claims: this enclosure is ours, that quarry is theirs. Rules protected group property and regulated who could take part.

  • CUnknowable

    Rules leave no direct trace before writing. Analogies show what is possible, not what happened, and should be used only to frame questions.

An honest warning

Everything on this page is analogy. There is no excavated evidence for any specific rule, court, fine or punishment at Göbeklitepe or any other Taş Tepeler site, and there cannot be: norms are spoken, and these people did not write. What follows borrows from anthropologists' accounts of recent foraging societies in Africa, Australia and elsewhere. Those societies are not living fossils. They are modern people with their own histories, living in environments unlike the early Holocene Urfa region. They show the range of what is humanly possible. They do not tell us what happened.

What foragers tend to do about food

Across many recent hunter-gatherer groups, large game is not the hunter's to keep. Meat is distributed through the camp, often by someone other than the person who made the kill. Nicolas Peterson coined the phrase "demand sharing" for a pattern in which giving is prompted by the asking of others, and refusing is shameful. James Woodburn linked this to what he called immediate-return economies, where food is eaten soon after it is obtained and nobody accumulates.

The one archaeological observation that touches on this is negative. Göbeklitepe has enormous quantities of grinding equipment and animal bone but, so far, no large stores. Food made there seems to have been eaten there. That fits a setting of open-handed distribution. It would equally fit hosts who kept their stores at home.

What happens to people who break the rules

Here the ethnography is consistent and rather undramatic. Polly Wiessner's study of Ju/'hoansi conversations found that most enforcement was verbal: joking, pointed complaint, public criticism. Stronger sanctions existed but were used sparingly. Christopher Boehm's comparative work describes groups jointly resisting anyone who tries to command: they laugh at them, ignore them, move away, and only in rare, extreme cases kill them.

Why the analogy may fail

The builders of the Taş Tepeler were not the mobile, lightly equipped bands that most of this literature describes. They quarried multi-tonne pillars, maintained cisterns and returned to the same buildings for centuries. Woodburn himself contrasted immediate-return societies with delayed-return ones, in which people hold rights over assets that yield a return later: traps, boats, stored food, or indeed buildings. In those societies ethnographers find firmer property claims, binding obligations between kin groups and sometimes ranked statuses.

The excavators have noted hints in that direction. Different animals dominate different enclosures, which may mean different groups owned them. Some categories of everyday object are missing from the site, which they read as possible restriction on who took part. If so, the rules that mattered may have been less about sharing meat and more about access: who could enter, who could see, who could know.

What would settle it?

Nothing will recover the rules themselves. Indirect tests are possible, though: comparing diet between individuals through isotopes, to see whether everyone ate alike; comparing houses for differences in size and stored goods; and studying skeletons for healed and unhealed injuries, to gauge how much violence there was and who suffered it.

Which analogy would you trust, and how far? Argue your position, and say what would change your mind.

Evidence cards

  • Evidence

    No large stores

    Despite food processing on a very large scale, no large storage facilities have been identified at Göbeklitepe; the excavators argue food was produced for immediate use. This is consistent with sharing at gatherings but says nothing about the rules.

    Dietrich et al. 2019, PLOS ONE

  • Hypothesis

    Demand sharing and levelling

    Among immediate-return foragers such as the Hadza, food is shared on demand, hoarding is disapproved of and successful hunters are expected to be modest. The study describes living societies, not Neolithic ones.

    Woodburn 1982

  • Hypothesis

    Punishment is mostly talk

    Analysis of recorded conversations among the Ju/'hoansi found that norms were enforced chiefly by mockery, complaint and criticism, with harsher measures such as ostracism kept as a last resort, and violence rare.

    Wiessner 2005

  • Hypothesis

    Reverse dominance

    A cross-cultural survey argues that in egalitarian societies the group collectively restrains would-be dominators, by ridicule, disobedience, desertion and, in extreme cases, killing.

    Boehm 1993

  • Counter-evidence

    Not simple foragers

    Communities that build in stone, stay for long periods and invest labour for delayed rewards differ from the mobile groups that supply most analogies. In such delayed-return systems ethnography records stronger claims of ownership, debt and inherited standing.

    Woodburn 1982

  • Hypothesis

    Ritual as conflict management

    The excavation team has argued that shared ritual at Göbeklitepe and Körtik Tepe helped to contain tensions between groups at a time of growing communities. This is an interpretation of the archaeological record, not a recovered rule.

    Clare et al. 2019

Positions (0)

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Sources

  1. [1]J. Woodburn. Egalitarian Societies. Man 17(3): 431–451 (1982)
  2. [2]P. Wiessner. Norm enforcement among the Ju/'hoansi Bushmen: a case of strong reciprocity?. Human Nature 16(2): 115–145 (2005)
  3. [3]C. Boehm. Egalitarian Behavior and Reverse Dominance Hierarchy. Current Anthropology 34(3): 227–254 (1993)
  4. [4]N. Peterson. Demand Sharing: Reciprocity and the Pressure for Generosity among Foragers. American Anthropologist 95(4): 860–874 (1993)
  5. [5]L. Dietrich, J. Meister, O. Dietrich, J. Notroff, et al.. Cereal processing at Early Neolithic Göbekli Tepe, southeastern Turkey. PLOS ONE 14(5): e0215214 (2019)
  6. [6]L. Clare, O. Dietrich, J. Gresky, J. Notroff, J. Peters, N. Pöllath. Ritual Practices and Conflict Mitigation at Early Neolithic Körtik Tepe and Göbekli Tepe, Upper Mesopotamia. In: Violence and the Sacred in the Ancient Near East, Cambridge University Press, 96–128 (2019)
  7. [7]Emblematic signs? On the iconography of animals at Göbekli Tepe. DAI, The Tepe Telegrams (2016)
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